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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of collaborative deep learning with privacy con-
straints. Building upon differentially private decentralized semi-supervised learn-
ing, we introduce homomorphically encrypted operations to extend the set of
threats considered so far. While previous methods relied on the existence of an
hypothetical ’trusted’ third party, we designed specific aggregation operations in
the encrypted domain that allow us to circumvent this assumption. This makes
our method practical to real-life scenario where data holders do not trust any third
party to process their datasets. Crucially the computational burden of the approach
is maintained reasonable, making it suitable to deep learning applications. In order
to illustrate the performances of our method, we carried out numerical experiments
using image datasets in a classification context.
1 Introduction
Modern neural networks achieve state-of-the-art performances in a variety of fields such as natural
language processing [36], image recognition [22] and speech recognition [24]. With the large
adoption of such models in several domains, including critical ones, researchers and practitioners are
observing growing concerns on the security and privacy of the tools they develop. In this paper, we
are especially interested in collaborative deep learning with privacy constraints.
Motivating example. An example of scenario from the field of cybersecurity is when several actors
each hold a database of cybersecurity incident signatures, that have occurred on their customer
networks. Building a model from a larger set of such signatures would lead to improved detection
capabilities. However, these databases are highly-sensitive and highly-valuable. As such, they cannot
be disclosed (notwithstanding legal barriers to do so). In such a setting, the data owners wish to
collaboratively train a global model while preserving the confidentiality of their learning sets.
A gold standard definition of privacy-preserving machine learning is differential privacy [15, 25].
In the context of collaborative learning, several recent works [5, 6, 18, 10, 34, 35] focused on this
definition to build privacy preserving deep learning models. However, these techniques rely on a
’trusted’ aggregation server that gathers non private information before processing some sanitizing
scheme. In real-life scenarios the absence of such a server will jeopardize the privacy and security
of the overall learning procedure. This paper presents a new approach called SPEED which obtains
differential privacy guarantees without the need for a trusted aggregation server. To do so, we use a
decentralized semi-supervised learning procedure summarized in Figure 1. In a nutshell, SPEED
works as follows. First, every data owner builds a local model (a.k.a. teacher model) using its
own private database. Then, given a new unlabeled dataset, the teacher models output encrypted
predictions and send them to the server which computes a differentially private aggregation in the
encrypted domain to obtain an encrypted labeled dataset. From this new dataset, a collaborative
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Figure 1: SPEED - The teacher models send to the aggregation server their encrypted answers to the
student’s queries. The server homomorphically performs the aggregation in the encrypted domain
and sends the result back to the student model which decrypts it and uses it for training.
model (a.k.a. student model) is learned in a semi-supervised manner. Our approach is supported by
strong theoretical guarantees in terms of differential privacy and provably-secure cryptography.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 relates our work to the literature. In Section 3, we give some
technical background on differential privacy and homomorphic encryption. In Section 4, we first
present SPEED when the aggregation server is called honest but curious i.e. it is not trusted but not
completely adversarial. We then go beyond the honest but curious model and present another version
of SPEED when the aggregation server is not cooperative. Section 5 presents our experimental
results. SPEED achieves state-or-the-art accuracy and privacy with a mild computational overhead
w.r.t previous works. Section 6 concludes the paper by stating some open questions for further works.
2 Related Work
Differential privacy (DP) Recent works considered to use differential privacy in collaborative
settings close to the one we consider [5, 6, 18, 10, 34, 35]. Among them, the most efficient technique
in terms of accuracy and privacy guarantees is Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE)
first presented in [34] and refined in [35]. PATE uses semi-supervised learning to privately transfer
to the student model the knowledge of the ensemble of teachers by using a differentially private
aggregation method. This approach considers a setting very close to ours with the notable difference
that the aggregation server is trusted. Hence applying PATE in our scenario makes the teacher models
vulnerable. To tackle this issue, our work builds upon PATE idea, and adds a layer of homomorphic
encryption in order for the overall learning to be kept private.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE). HE allows to perform computations over encrypted data. In
particular, this can be used so that the model can perform both training and prediction without
handling cleartext data. In terms of learning, the naive approach would be to have the training
sets homomorphically encrypted, sent to a server for training to be done in the encrypted domain
and the resulting (encrypted) model sent back to the participants for decryption. However, putting
aside many subtleties, even by deploying all the arsenal available in the HE practitioner toolbox
(batching, transciphering, etc.) this would be impractical as “classical” learning is both computation
and know-how intensive and HE operations are intrinsically costly. As a consequence, there are only
very few works that capitalize on HE for private training [21, 23] and inference [19, 26] of machine
learning tasks. Moreover, since some attacks can be performed in a black-box setting, the system is
still vulnerable to attacks from the end user who has access to the decryption key. In our framework,
we do not use HE directly to build the model, we use it as a mean for the aggregation to be kept
private. That way, we are protected against potential threats from the aggregation server, which does
not have the decryption key, and we keep a manageable computational overhead.
Private aggregation. Several approaches have been considered to limit the need for a trusted server
when applying differential privacy, for example by considering local differential privacy [28, 13, 27].
In practice it often results in applying to much noise, and maintaining utility can be difficult [43, 28]
especially for deep learning applications. In order to recover more accuracy while keeping privacy,
some works combined decentralized noise distribution (a.k.a. distributed differential privacy [39])
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and encryption schemes [37, 2, 20, 39] in the context of aggregation of distributed time-series. Our
work contributes to this line of research. However, our framework, which combines distributed DP
and HE, is the first one to be efficient enough to investigate deep learning applications.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Differential privacy
Differential privacy [14] provides a guarantee that under a reasonable privacy budget (, δ), two
adjacent databases produce statistically indistinguishable results. In the following, two databases d
and d′ are said adjacent if they differ by at most one example.
Definition 1. A randomized mechanism A with output range R satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if
for any two adjacent databases d, d′ and for any subset of outputs S ⊂ R one has
P [A(d) ∈ S] ≤ eP [A(d′) ∈ S] + δ. (1)
Definition 2. Let A be a randomized mechanism with output range R and d, d′ a pair of adjacent
databases. Let aux denote an auxiliary input. For any o ∈ R, the privacy loss at o is defined as
c(o;A, aux, d, d′) := log
(
P[A(aux, d) = o]
P[A(aux, d′) = o]
)
. (2)
The privacy loss random variable C(A, aux, d, d′) is defined as c(A(d);A, aux, d, d′), i.e. the
random variable defined by evaluating the privacy loss at an outcome sampled from A(d).
In deep learning, it is not simple to keep track of the privacy loss due to the numerous calls the
algorithm makes to the database. To evaluate the privacy budget, it is useful to introduce the notion
of moments accountant [1].
Definition 3. With the same notation as above, the moments accountant is defined for any l ∈ R∗+ as
αA(l) := max
aux,d,d′
αA(l; aux, d, d′) (3)
where the maximum is taken over any auxiliary input aux and any pair of adjacent databases d, d′
and αA(l; aux, d, d′) := log (E [exp(lC(A, aux, d, d′))]) is the moment generating function of the
privacy loss random variable.
The privacy analysis of our method boils down to the following theorem first introduced in [34].
Theorem 1 ([34]). Let , l ∈ R∗+. Let A be a (, 0)-differentially private mechanism and q ≥
P[A(d) 6= o∗] for some outcome o∗. If q < e−1e2−1 , then for any aux and any pair d, d′ of adjacent
databases, A satisfies
αA(l; aux, d, d′) ≤ min
(
l,
2l(l + 1)
2
, log
(
(1− q)
(
1− q
1− eq
)l
+ qel
))
. (4)
Theorem 1 coupled with some properties of the moments accountant (composability and tail bound)
allows one to devise the overall privacy budget (, δ) for the learning procedure. We refer the
interested reader to [34] for more details. Throughout this paper, we present theorems that can be
used as building blocks for Theorem 1, and evaluate the privacy budget accordingly.
3.2 Homomorphic encryption
Let us consider Λ and Ω which respectively are the set of cleartexts (a.k.a. the clear domain) and the
set of ciphertexts (a.k.a. the encrypted domain). An homomorphic encryption system first consists in
two algorithms Encpk : Λ −→ Ω and Decsk : Ω −→ Λ where pk and sk are data structures which
represent the public encryption key and the private decryption key of the cryptosystem.
Homomorphic encryption systems are by necessity probabilistic, meaning that some randomness has
to be involved in the Enc function and that the ciphertexts set Ω is significantly much bigger than
the cleartexts set Λ. Any (decent) homomorphic encryption scheme possesses the semantic security
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property meaning that, given Enc(m) and polynomially many pairs (mi,Enc(mi)) it is hard2 to gain
any information on m with a significant advantage over guessing. Most importantly, an homomorphic
encryption scheme offers two additional operators ⊕ and ⊗ such that
• Enc(m1)⊕ Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 +m2) ∈ Ω.
• Enc(m1)⊗ Enc(m2) = Enc(m1m2) ∈ Ω.
When these two operators are supported without restriction by an homomorphic scheme, it is said
to be a Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme. A FHE with Λ = Z2 is Turing-complete
and, as such, is in principle sufficient to perform any computation in the encrypted domain with a
computational overhead depending on the security target3. In practice, though, the ⊕ and ⊗ are much
more computationally costly than their clear domain counterparts and this has led to the development
of several approaches to HE schemes design each with their pros and cons.
Somewhat HE (SHE). Somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes, such as BGV [9] or BFV [16],
provide both operators but with several constraints. Indeed, in these cryptosystems the ⊗ operator is
much more costly than the⊕ operator and the cost of the former strongly depends on the multiplicative
depth of the calculation, that is the maximum number of multiplications that have to be chained
(although this depth can be optimized [4]). Interestingly, most SHE schemes offer a batching
capability by which multiple cleartexts can be packed in one ciphertext resulting in (quite massively)
parallel homomorphic operations i.e.,
Enc(m1, ...,mκ)⊕ Enc(m′1, ...,m′κ) = Enc(m1 +m′1, ...,mκ +m′κ) (5)
(and similarly so for ⊗). Typically, several hundreds such slots are available and, in some circum-
stances, this allows to significantly speed up encrypted-domain calculations.
Fully HE (FHE). Fully homomorphic encryption schemes offer both the ⊕ and ⊗ operators without
restrictions on multiplicative depth. At the time of writing, only the FHE-over-the-torus approach,
instantiated in the TFHE cryptosystem [11], offers practical performances. In this cryptosystem,
⊕ and ⊗ have the same constant cost. On the downside, TFHE offers no batching capabilities. To
get the best of all worlds, the TFHE scheme is often hybridized with SHE by means of operators
allowing to homomorphically switch among several ciphertext formats [7] in order to perform each
part of calculation with the most appropriate scheme (see e.g. [48]).
4 SPEED: a framework for Secure, Private, and Efficient Deep Learning
Let us consider a set of n owners each holding a personal sensitive database di. The personal databases
are disjoint, meaning that no example can be present in two different personal databases. The whole
database d = (d1, . . . , dn) is the union of the n personal databases. We aim at building a collaborative
model (a.k.a. student model) mapping an input space X to an output space [K] = {1, ..,K}. To do
this while keeping the process private, we follow the tripartite setting illustrated by Figure 1. SPEED
can be divided in two layers, the first one ensures that the learning procedure is DP by using a proxy
aggregation server, and the second one adds HE to avoid threats from this server.
4.1 Learning procedure with a trusted (Trusted) aggregation server
Trusted aggregation server. In this section, we suppose that the data holders have access to a trusted
aggregation server. This means that the server takes a set of inputs from the owners, process them,
and erase them immediately after the processing is completed. With this kind of server, we can build
the following learning procedure (first introduced in [34]) with DP guarantees:
1. For every owner i, learn a teacher model fi from the personal database di.
2. Define the trusted aggregation server as follows: A : x 7→ argmaxk∈[K] [nk + Yk] , where
nk := |{i : fi(x) = k}| and Yk is a Laplace noise with mean 0 and scale 1γ , γ ∈ R∗+.
2“Hard” means that it requires solving a reference (conjectured) computationally hard problem on which the
security of the cryptosystem hence depends. From a practical viewpoint, given a security target λ, the concrete
parameters of an homomorphic scheme are chosen such that the best known (exponential-time) algorithms for
solving the underlying reference problem require an order of magnitude of 2λ nontrivial operations.
3Polynomial in λ.
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3. Train a student model on a public unlabeled dataset. To do so, the student model selects inputs
from the unlabeled dataset and submits them to the teachers. Each teacher makes a prediction and
sends it to the aggregation server which then outputs a label for the student to learn.
Privacy guarantees. The privacy guarantees of this method come from the aggregation mechanism
A, also known as the report noisy max scheme in the DP literature. Thanks to Theorems 1 and 2, we
can evaluate the overall privacy budget of the procedure (see Table 2) with regard to the number of
queries the student model makes to the aggregation server.
Theorem 2 ([15]). Let A be the report noisy max as above. Then A is (2γ, 0)-differentially private.
This learning procedure ensures privacy only if A is trusted. If not, A can directly look at the votes
from each model, which makes the data holders vulnerable.
4.2 Learning with an Honest But Curious (HBC) aggregation server.
Honest But Curious aggregation server. Let us now suppose that the aggregation server is no
longer trusted, but HBC instead. An aggregation server is called HBC if given a set of inputs, it
applies the processing as asked but stores the inputs4. To secure the aggregation w.r.t an HBC server,
we add a layer of HE on top of the procedure from Section 4.1. The aggregation server will perform
encrypted-domain computations under an homomorphic encryption scheme whose owner is the
student model who generates and knows both pk and sk. When being submitted an unlabeled input,
the teachers encrypt their predictions under pk and send these encryptions to the server. The server
has the responsibility to homomorphically perform the aggregation operator in order to produce an
encryption of the operator output (e.g. a label) which will be sent back to the student and used by
the latter for learning, after due decryption. Without the homomorphic encryption layer, an HBC
server has access to all the teachers’ predictions and can exploit this knowledge at will. This access is
denied when the server works in the encrypted domain therefore avoiding information leakage.
Technical details on the HE scheme (computing the counts). The most appropriate way for
computing an histogram by means of FHE consists in having the teachers sending encrypted one-hot
encodings of their vote. That is, rather than sending fi(x), the i-th teacher sends a K-dimensional
vector, say z(i), whose fi(x)-th component is an encryption of 1 while all the others are encryptions
of 0. Recall that FHE schemes are necessarily probabilistic which means that each clear domain
value has (astronomically) many different encryptions and that the encryptions of two clear domain
values are computationally indistinguishable. We then have
nk =
n∑
i=1
z
(i)
k .
When the sum is performed by means of the homomorphic summation operator provided by the
FHE scheme over encrypted z(i)k ’s, the aggregation server obtains an encryption of the number of
times class k has been voted for. The server then generates the Laplace noise component (in the clear
domain), which it then adds to its encryption of nk. Although homomorphic encryption schemes
usually provide a ciphertext vs cleartext homomorphic addition operator, the server uses the student’s
public key to encrypt the Laplace noise component and then uses the homomorphic addition operator
to apply it to nk. So far, we have only needed homomorphic addition which is a good start. Then
an argmax operator must be performed after the noisy histogram calculation. However, efficiently
handling the highly nonlinear argmax function by means of FHE is much more challenging.
Technical details on the HE scheme (computing the argmax). Most prior work on secure argmax
computations use some kind of interaction between a party that holds a sensitive vector of values and
the party that wants to obtain the argmax over those values. The non-linearity of the argmax operator
presents unique challenges that have mostly been handled by allowing the two interested parties to
exchange information. This means increased communication costs and, in some cases, information
leakage. This is with the exception of [48]. They provide a fully non-interactive homomorphic
argmax computation scheme based on the TFHE encryption. We implemented and parametrized
their scheme to fit the specific training problems presented in Section 5. We present here the main
idea behind this novel FHE argmax scheme. For more details, see the original paper. The TFHE
4By input we mean any information sent by the data holders. Hence, the Laplace noise is not stored.
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encryption scheme provides a bootstrap operation that can be applied on any scalar ciphertext. Its
purpose is threefold: switch the encryption key; reduce the noise; apply a non-linear operation on the
underlying plaintext value. This underlying operation can be seen as a function
gt,a,b(x) =
{
a if x > t
b if x < t.
One notable application is that of a "sign" bootstrap: we can extract the sign of the input with
the underlying function g0,1,0(x). The argmax computation in the ciphertext space is made as
follows. For every k, k′, k 6= k′, we compare the values nk + Yk and nk′ + Yk′ with a subtraction
(nk + Yk − nk′ − Yk′) and application of a sign bootstrap operation. This yields θk,k′ , a variable
with value 1 if nk + Yk > nk′ + Yk′ and 0 otherwise. Therefore the complexity will be quadratic in
the number of classes. For a given k we can then obtain a boolean truth value (0 or 1) for whether
nk + Yk is the maximum value. To this end, we compute
Θk =
∑
i 6=k
θk,i.
nk is the max if and only if, for all i one has θk,i = 1 i.e. Θk = K − 1. We can therefore apply
another bootstrap operation with gK− 32 ,1,0. If Θk = K − 1, the boostrap will return an encryption
of 1, and return an encryption of 0 otherwise. Once decrypted, the position of the only non-zero
value is the argmax. Because the underlying function gt,a,b is applied homomorphically, its output
is inherently probabilistic. In the FHE scheme used, an error is inserted in all of the ciphertexts at
encryption time to ensure an appropriate level of security. This means that if two values are too
close, then the sign bootstrap operation might return the wrong result over their difference. The exact
impact of this approximation on the accuracy is evaluated in Section 5.
Privacy guarantees. In terms of DP, the homomorphic computation of the argmax does not change
the privacy guarantees because the perturbations it causes can be viewed as post-processing. See
supplementary material for more details on this question.
Remark. Another solution would be to send the noisy histogram nk +Yk of the counts for each class
k to the student and let her process the argmax in the clear domain. This could indeed be performed
with a plain-old additively-homomorphic cryptosystem such as Paillier or (additive-flavored) ElGamal,
avoiding the machinery of the homomorphic argmax. Nevertheless, this approach was put aside
because sending the histogram instead of the argmax would provide much worse DP guarantees.
More details on the privacy analysis of this approach are available in the supplementary material.
Despite of the fact that this model is sufficient in many real-world scenarios, in Section 4.3 we will
consider an approach for going beyond this HBC aggregation server.
4.3 Learning Beyond the Honest But Curious (BHBC) aggregation server
Beyond the Honest But Curious aggregation server. In this section, we relax our assumptions on
the aggregation server and chose not to trust it to generate the Laplace noise. Indeed, we consider
that the server may store the noise (that it generated in clear) and couple it with an attack on the
student model (e.g. model inversion) to estimate the output of the aggregation without noise, therefore
breaking the DP guarantees on the sensitive data. A possible workaround to circumvent this is to
distribute the responsibility for noise generation to all the teachers. To do so, we use an interesting
property of the Laplace distribution called infinite divisibility5 (see e.g. [29]). This enables us to
delegate the noise generation to the teachers while keeping the same overall noise and thus the same
privacy guarantees and the same utility as in the HBC setting.
Proposition 1 ([29]). Let m ∈ N and γ ∈ R∗+. Let G(i)p , for (i, p) ∈ [m] × [2], be i.i.d. random
variables following the Gamma distribution of shape 1m and scale
1
γ . Then
∑m
i=1(G
(i)
1 − G(i)2 )
follows the Laplace distribution of mean 0 and scale 1γ .
Distributing the noise among the teachers. This property gives rise to a secure aggregation
architecture. We charge each teacher i to generate for each class k a noise drawn from G(i)k,1 −G(i)k,2
5Another well-known example of infinitely divisible probability distribution is the Gaussian distribution
which can be seen as the sum of Gaussian distributions of well chosen scale parameter. In a possible further
work, we could indeed replace the (distributed) Laplace noise by a (distributed) Gaussian noise.
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where G(i)k,1 and G
(i)
k,2 are i.i.d. random variables following the gamma distribution of shape
1
n and
scale 1γ , where γ ∈ R∗+. Then for any query sent by the student, the teacher i sends the noisy one-hot
encoded vector whose kth coordinate corresponds to z(i)k +G
(i)
k,1 −G(i)k,2.
Remark. Proposition 1 tells us that, when summing up the noisy vectors, the aggregation server gets
the same output as if the noise were drawn from a Laplace distribution. Hence, this scheme gives
exactly the same guarantees in terms of differential privacy as the one from Section 4.2, under a more
conservative threat model.
Resilience to failure of the teachers. As we have decided no to trust the aggregation server to
generate the noise necessary to the privacy guarantees, we may also assume that some teachers
might fail in generating the individual noise drawn from the difference of Gamma distributions. The
following theorem quantifies the privacy cost of such failures. In a nutshell, as long as half of the
teachers did actually generate their noise properly, we are able to guaranty that the aggregation server
ensures some amount of differential privacy.
Theorem 3. Let τ ∈ ( 12 , 1) be the fraction of the teachers that did send their noisy votes properly
to the aggregation server. The remaining teachers are assumed to have sent their votes without any
noise (but still encrypted). We denote A the aggregation mechanism. Then, A is (, 0)-differentially
private, with
 = 2γ + 2 (1− τ) log
(
w(τ)
[
Γ (2τ − 1)
Γ (τ)
×
(
1 +
1− τ
w(τ)
)] 1
1−τ
+ 1
)
where Γ: x ∈ R∗+ 7→
∫ +∞
0
tx−1e−xdt and w(τ) = −W−1
(
(τ − 1) eτ−1−2γ)+ τ − 1, W−1 being
the lower real branch of the Lambert function.
This theorem allows us to control the privacy cost by the ratio 1 − τ of the teachers who failed in
generating their noise. Indeed, using the asymptotic behavior of W−1 6, one can see that our bound
approaches 2γ when τ approaches 1, hence recovering the classical bound of the centralized Laplace
noise. As for the differential privacy results from Section 4.1, we combine Theorems 1 and 3 to
evaluate the overall privacy budget of the procedure (see Section 5 for more results)7.
5 Experimental results
Homomorphic argmax accuracy. As we mention in Section 4.2, the homomorphic computation
of the argmax is inherently probabilistic. This is due both to the noise added to any ciphertext at
encryption time, and to limitations of the bootstrapping operation in terms of accuracy. Table 1
summarizes the impact of this loss of accuracy on the overall performance of our scheme. On MNIST
dataset [30], we evaluate the method over 4 different settings (HBC, BHBC with α = 1/0.9/0.7) and
compare the cleartext argmax to our homomorphic argmax. Our implementation of the HE argmax
has an average accuracy of 99.4%, meaning that it retrieves the cleartext argmax 99.4% of the time.
To obtain a more general and conservative measure of the inherent accuracy of the HE argmax (which
can be applied on any dataset), we make the teachers give uniformly random answers to the queries.
In this setting, most counts nk are likely to be close to one another, which makes even a classical
argmax useless. This kind of scenario can be seen as worst-case, since the teacher voting is adversarial
to argmax computation. Even in this scenario, and with the same parameters as for MNIST, our
implementation of the HE argmax algorithm still produces an average accuracy of 90%. Hence, an
accuracy of 90% can be considered a lower bound for any adaptation of this argmax technique to
other datasets. Yet in practice a tweaking of the parameters can yield a better accuracy even for this
worst-case scenario, at the cost of time efficiency.
HE time overhead. We implemented the homomorphic argmax computation presented in section
4.2. Without parallelizing, a single argmax query requires just under 4 seconds to compute on an Intel
Core i7-6600U CPU. Importantly, this does not depend on the input data. The costliest operation
6W−1(x) ∼ log(−x) in the neighborhood of 0−
7Note that, calling S the subset of teachers who did generate the noise, to calculate the DP guarantee from
the point of view of a teacher i of S, one must use τ = |S|−1
n
instead of τ = |S|
n
since i knows the noise she
generated.
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is the computation of θ. Any other part of the scheme is negligible in comparison. Therefore, once
the parameters are set, the time performance depends solely on the number of classes (the number
of bootstrap comparisons is quadratic in the number of classes). As such, 100 queries require 6.5
minutes and 1000 queries 65 minutes. Of course, the queries can be performed in parallel to decrease
the latency allowing for much more challenging applications.
Learning setup. To evaluate the performances of our framework, we test our method on MNIST
dataset [30]. To represent the data holders, we divide the dataset in 250 equally distributed and disjoint
subsets. Then we apply the following procedures. We refer the interested reader to supplementary
material for more details on the hyper-parameters and learning procedure.
• Teacher models. Given a dataset, a data holder builds a local model by stacking two convolutional
layers with max pooling and a fully connected layer with ReLu activations.
• Student model. Following the idea from [34], we train the student in a semi-supervised fashion.
Unlabeled inputs are used to estimate a good prior distribution using a GAN-based technique first
introduced in [38]. Then we use a limited amount of queries (100 here) to obtain labeled examples
which we use to fine tune the model.
As the student model can substantially vary based on the selected subset of labeled examples, the
out-of-sample accuracy has been evaluated 17 times, with 100 labeled examples sampled from a set
of 9000 ones. For each experiment, the remaining 1000 examples have been used to evaluate the
student model accuracy.
Tables 1 & 2: Table 1 presents the accuracy of our argmax algorithm. We ran it over 4 sets of
1000 queries from 250 teachers on the MNIST problem. We give here accuracy results for the 4
frameworks, an average over the 4 frameworks, and the worst-case accuracy over uniformly random
inputs. Table 2 summarizes our results for MNIST dataset with 250 teachers and 100 student queries.
We used an inverse noise scale γ = 3.3. The DP guarantees, computed by composability over the
100 queries, are given for δ = 10−5.
Table 1: HE argmax accuracy
Framework Accuracy [%]
HBC 99.1
BHBC, τ = 1 99.8
BHBC, τ = 0.9 99.5
BHBC, τ = 0.7 99.3
Average 99.4
Worst-case 90.0
Table 2: MNIST Experimental results
Framework  Acc. (± std) [%] HE overhead
Non-private - 96.22 (±2.27) -
Trusted 2.76 95.95 (±2.97) -
HBC 2.76 95.91 (±2.57)
6.5 minBHBC, τ = 1 2.76 95.91 (±2.57)BHBC, τ = 0.9 2.93 96.02 (±2.92)
BHBC, τ = 0.7 3.88 96.06 (±2.61)
Performances on MNIST. Table 2 displays our experimental results for SPEED with MNIST and
compares them to a non-private baseline and to Trusted framework which does not involve HE. In
spite of the variability of the accuracy, we observe a tradeoff between accuracy and DP. Indeed,
while the reported average accuracy does not vary much across conditions, consistent rankings of
the methods have been observed, confirming the expected average rank of the method based on the
amount of added noise. Importantly, it should be noted that the variance is high in each condition. It
masks the fact that the distribution is highly skewed, with a majority of results in the 0.975− 0.985
range, and a few samplings yielding an out-of-sample accuracy around 0.90. As expected, the best DP
guarantees ( = 2.76) are obtained in the HBC framework or, equivalently, in the BHBC framework
when all the teachers generated noise (τ = 1), but these are the cases where the accuracy is the lowest.
On the contrary, when some teachers failed to generate noise in the BHBC framework (τ = 0.9 and
τ = 0.7), the counts are more precise, leading to a slightly better accuracy but less DP guarantees.
We refer the reader to supplementary material for additional experiments on SVHN dataset [32].
6 Open question for further works
The next step towards collaborative deep learning with privacy would be to design new aggregation
operators, more suitable to FHE performances yet still providing good DP bounds. In particular, as
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emphasized by Section E in the supplementary material, a linear or quadratic aggregation operator
would be amenable to almost negligible homomorphic computations overhead. This lighter homo-
morphic layer would enable to extend the applicability of our framework to more complex datasets.
Such aggregation operators would also allow to associate homomorphic calculations with verifiable
computing techniques (e.g. [17]) whereby the server would provide an encrypted aggregation result
along with a formal proof that aggregation was indeed done correctly. These perspectives would then
allow to address threats further beyond the honest-but-curious model.
Broader impact
Deep learning is becoming pervasive in our connected society and has already led to countless
practical applications impacting, for better or worse, our daily lives. However, its applications
ecosystem has so far developed with too limited concern for user or data privacy and is subject to an
expanding body of statistical attack techniques (de-anonymization, model inversion, data extraction
from model memory, etc.). With growing public awareness and new legislation such as the GDPR,
there is now an urgent need to tackle a number of privacy challenges in order to pave the way for
the next generation of systems. Indeed, in the case of Europe for instance, being at the forefront of
online citizen privacy protection should not translate into a loss of competitiveness for developing
and benefiting from new advances in deep learning.
Today, many deep neural network systems are operational and legions of others can be bootstrapped
with no or very little additional training data. However, when in operation, these systems need to
interact with more focused user-centric data which are in urgent need for stronger privacy in the
GDPR era. Additionally, we are witnessing a commoditization of machine learning techniques in
well-defined scenarios (mono-database and explicit cost function). Consequently, residual value
comes from cross domain databases, or multiple mono-domain databases, carefully chosen by an
analyst. Still, training a neural network from several private datasets is generally not possible due
to the inability to share learning data for commercial, ethical or legal reasons. Additionally, neural
network paradigms are constantly emerging with an insatiable appetite for new kinds of training
data. In the longer term, due to legal and societal constraints on data localization and privacy, it
will become more complex to even gather the large databases needed to bootstrap future high value
applications. This will especially be so in more critical fields such as the medical or genomics fields
unless a paradigm shift occurs to put privacy at the core of deep learning system design and operation.
With a good timing to address these challenges, the framework of provably-secure cryptography,
which provides a well-founded corpus of security properties and techniques, has dramatically ex-
panded its functional capabilities beyond “just” encryption by developing tools to perform general
computations directly over encrypted data. One of the flagships of these new cryptographic tools is
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). FHE is relatively recent as it was shown to be theoretically
possible only around 2010. Yet, after 10 years of very active research towards turning its theory
into a practical reality, homomorphic encryption is ready to enter the practitioners’ toolbox to help
addressing deep learning privacy challenges.
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Supplementary material
A DP analysis of the learning procedure
In this section, we describe the procedure that computes the overall DP guarantees of the student
model learning stage. We summarize this procedure in Section A.1, and demonstrate the theorems
we use in Sections A.2 and A.4.
A.1 Analysis algorithm
Let us suppose that for every query Q of the student model, we have a privacy guarantee using
Theorem 3 and that we can upperbound the probability P[A(d;Q) 6= o∗] that A outputs some
specific output o∗ (in practice we choose o∗ to be the unnoisy argmax). Then, Theorem 1 gives us
an upperbound on the moments accountant per query8. The computation of these building blocks is
detailed in Sections A.2 and A.4, and the procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm to determine the overall privacy guarantee of the learning procedure
Input :number of teachers n, number of classes K, ratio of successful teachers τ (for BHBC), set
of queries Q, unnoisy teachers’ counts nk, inverse noise scale γ, lmax, δ
Output :
for l in [lmax] do
α(l)← 0
for query Q in Q do
Compute the privacy cost of Q and an upperbound of P[A(d;Q) 6= o∗];
Derive the moments accountant αQ(l) with Theorem 1;
α(l)← α(l) + αQ(l);
end
(l)← α(l)−δl ;
end
← minl∈[lmax] (l);
Using the moments accountant per query, we evaluate the overall moments accountant by compos-
ability, applying the following theorem from [1].
Theorem 4 ([1]). Let p ∈ N. Suppose that a mechanism A consists of a sequence of adaptative
mechanisms A1, . . . ,Ap where Ai :
∏i−1
j=1Rj ×D 7→ Ri. Then, for any l ∈ R∗+,
αA(l) ≤
k∑
i=1
αAi(l).
Finally, parameter δ being chosen, the privacy guarantee is derived from the overall moments
accountant applying the tail bound property, stated in Theorem 5 from [1].
Theorem 5 ([1]). For any  ∈ R∗+, the mechanism is (, δ)-differentially private for
δ = min
l
exp(αA(l)− l).
A.2 DP guarantee per query in the BHBC framework
In this section, we consider the BHBC framework and we prove Theorem 3 from the main paper. In
the following, we consider γ ∈ R∗+ a fixed privacy parameter, introduce some functions and state
some lemmas that will be useful to demonstrate Theorem 3.
Let β ∈ ( 12 , 1). We denote
8Note that only the third value over which the minimum is taken in Theorem 1 is data-dependent and, as
such, requires this upperbound of P[A(d;Q) 6= o∗].
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• Iβ : z ∈ R+ 7→
∫ +∞
0
(t+ z)
β−1
tβ−1e−2γtdt
• Lβ : b ∈ R∗+ 7→
(
Γ(2β−1)
Γ(β)(1−e−b)
) 1
1−β
where Γ is the gamma function, defined as Γ : x ∈ R∗+ 7→
∫ +∞
0
tx−1 e−t dt.
Lemma 1. For any β ∈ ( 12 , 1) , z ∈ R∗+ and b ∈ R+, one has
Iβ (z) ≥ (2γ)1−β I β+1
2
(0) (b+ 2γz)
β−1 (
1− e−b) .
Proof. Let β ∈ ( 12 , 1), z ∈ R∗+, a ∈ R+.
Iβ (z) ≥
∫ a
0
(t+ z)
β−1
tβ−1e−2γtdt
≥ (a+ z)β−1
∫ a
0
tβ−1e−2γtdt
= (a+ z)
β−1
[∫ +∞
0
tβ−1e−2γtdt−
∫ +∞
a
tβ−1e−2γtdt
]
= (a+ z)
β−1
[
I β+1
2
(0)−
∫ +∞
0
(u+ a)
β−1
e−2γ(u+a)du
]
(by the substitution u = t− a)
≥ (a+ z)β−1
[
I β+1
2
(0)− e−2γa
∫ +∞
0
uβ−1e−2γudu
]
= (2γ)
1−β
I β+1
2
(0) (b+ 2γz)
β−1 (
1− e−b)
(where b = 2γa).
Lemma 2. For any β ∈ ( 12 , 1), Iβ (0) =
(
1
2γ
)2β−1
Γ (2β − 1).
Proof. Let β ∈ ( 12 , 1). One has
Iβ (0) =
∫ +∞
0
t2β−2e−2γtdt
=
(
1
2γ
)2β−2 ∫ +∞
0
u2β−2e−u
1
2γ
du
(by the substitution u = 2γt)
=
(
1
2γ
)2β−1
Γ (2β − 1) .
Lemma 3. Let τ ∈ ( 12 , 1] be the fraction of the teachers that did send their noisy votes properly to
the aggregation server. The remaining teachers are assumed to have sent their votes without any noise
(but still encrypted). We denote A the aggregation server. Then, A is (, 0)-differentially private,
where
 = 2γ + 2 inf
b∈R∗+
[(1− τ) log (Lτ (b) b+ 2γLτ (b) + 1)] .
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Proof. Preliminaries on the generalized Laplace distribution. For every teacher j who did not
fail, the noise sent by j is distributed as G(j)1 − G(j)2 where G(j)1 and G(j)2 are two i.i.d. random
variables with gamma density u 7→ 1
( 1γ )
1
n Γ( 1n )
u
1
n−1e−γu and characteristic function t 7→
(
1
1−i tγ
) 1
n
(see [29]). Hence, the characteristic function of G(j)1 −G(j)2 is ψ : t 7→
(
1
1+( tγ )
2
) 1
n
. By summing
over all the teachers who did send a noise, we get a total noise whose characteristic function is
ψτn : t 7→
(
1
1+( tγ )
2
)τ
. The corresponding moment generating function is t 7→
(
1
1−( tγ )
2
)τ
.
According to [31], this is the moment generating function of a generalized Laplace distribution whose
density is
u 7→

1
( 1γ )
2τ
Γ(τ)2
eγu
∫ +∞
u
tτ−1 (t− u)τ−1 e−2γtdt if u ≥ 0
1
( 1γ )
2τ
Γ(τ)2
eγu
∫ +∞
0
tτ−1 (t− u)τ−1 e−2γtdt if u < 0
which is actually
u 7→ 1(
1
γ
)2τ
Γ (τ)
2
eγ|u|
∫ +∞
|u|
tτ−1 (t− |u|)τ−1 e−2γtdt
(note that we need τ > 12 for the integral to be defined when u = 0)
=
1(
1
γ
)2τ
Γ (τ)
2
eγ|u|
∫ +∞
0
(t′ + |u|)τ−1(t′)τ−1e−2γ(t′+|u|)dt′
(by substitution t′ = t− |u|)
=
1(
1
γ
)2τ
Γ (τ)
2
e−γ|u|Iτ (|u|).
If τ = 1, we recover a Laplace distribution and the result comes from the classical result on the
Laplace mechanism (see e.g. [15]). In the following, we assume τ < 1.
Notations Let d = (d1, ..., dn) and d′ = (d′1, ..., d′n) be two adjacent databases, and x an unlabeled
data point. Let k ∈ [K]. We denote nk (respectively n′k) the number of teachers that vote for the
class k given the vector x. Since d and d′ are adjacent and the di ’s (resp. d′i ’s) are disjoint, we know
that at most one teacher will change between d and d′, which means that |nk − n′k| ≤ 1. Let us also
denote Ak the mechanism that reports the kth noisy count for vector x 9. Finally, let o ∈ R+ be a
possible outcome.
Let us suppose that nk 6= n′k10.
For any auxiliary input aux, we denote
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) := log
(
P[Ak(aux, d) = o]
P[Ak(aux, d′) = o]
)
the privacy loss at o for class k. Then we get the following:
9∑n
i=1 z
(i)
k +G
(i)
k,1 −G(i)k,2 with the paper notations
10Note that if nk = n′k, P (Ak (d) = o) = P (Ak (d′) = o) which would trivially complete the proof.
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c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) = log
(
P (Ak (d) = o)
P (Ak (d′) = o)
)
= log
(
e−γ|o−nk|Iτ (|o− nk|)
e−γ|o−n′k|Iτ (|o− n′k|)
)
= γ (|o− n′k| − |o− nk|) + log
(
Iτ (|o− nk|)
Iτ (|o− n′k|)
)
≤ γ|nk − n′k|+ log
(
Iτ (|o− nk|)
Iτ (|o− n′k|)
)
(using the triangle inequality)
≤ γ + log
(
Iτ (|o− nk|)
Iτ (|o− n′k|)
)
(because |nk − n′k| ≤ 1)
Let us denote λ (o) := |o−nk||nk−n′k| . We will exhibit two bounds depending on λ (o). The first one is
useful for small values of λ (o) whereas the second one is better for big values of λ (o). By merging
these two bounds we get the expected result.
First bound. Let us first remark that
|o− n′k| ≤ |o− nk|+ |nk − n′k| = (λ (o) + 1) |nk − n′k| ≤ 1 + λ (o)
Since Iτ is decreasing on R+ (because τ − 1 ≤ 0), we have Iτ (|o− n′k|) ≥ Iτ (1 + λ (o)) and
Iτ (|o− nk|) ≤ Iτ (0). Thus,
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) ≤ γ + log
(
Iτ (0)
Iτ (1 + λ (o))
)
.
Applying Lemmas 1 and 2, we deduce that, for all b ∈ R∗+,
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) ≤ γ + log
(
Iτ (0)
I τ+1
2
(0)
(
1
2γ
)1−τ)
+ (1− τ) log ([b+ 2γ (1 + λ (o))]]− log (1− e−b)
= γ + log
(
Γ (2τ − 1)
Γ (τ)
)
+ (1− τ) log ([b+ 2γ (1 + λ (o))])− log (1− e−b)
= γ + (1− τ) log (Lτ (b) [b+ 2γ (1 + λ (o))]] . (6)
This bound diverges when λ (o) approaches +∞, this is why we will exhibit another bound, more
useful for big values of λ (o).
Second bound. Let us assume that o 6= nk. Then λ (o) > 0. Let us consider also t ∈ R∗+. Then
t+ |o− n′k|
t+ |o− nk| = 1 +
|o− n′k| − |o− nk|
t+ |o− nk|
≤ 1 + |nk − n
′
k|
t+ |o− nk|
≤ 1 + |nk − n
′
k|
|o− nk|
= 1 +
1
λ (o)
.
Since τ − 1 ≤ 0, we deduce that
(t+ |o− nk|)τ−1 ≤ (t+ |o− n′k|)τ−1
(
1 +
1
λ (o)
)1−τ
.
16
As it is true for any t ∈ R∗+, we have
Iτ (|o− nk|) ≤ Iτ (|o− n′k|)
(
1 +
1
λ (o)
)1−τ
and finally
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) ≤ γ + (1− τ) log
(
1 +
1
λ (o)
)
. (7)
Merging the bounds. Let us fix b ∈ R∗+, and denote
f : λ ∈ R∗+ 7→ min
(
1 +
1
λ
;Lτ (b) [b+ 2γ (1 + λ)]
)
.
We extend f by continuity in 0 with f (0) = Lτ (b) (b+ 2γ). Then, from Equations (6) and (7) and
since 1− τ ≥ 0, we have
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) ≤ γ + (1− τ) log
(
f
( |o− nk|
|nk − n′k|
))
Let g : λ ∈ R∗+ 7→ 1 + 1λ and h : λ ∈ R+ 7→ Lτ (b) [b+ 2γ (1 + λ)]. g−h is continuous and strictly
decreasing on R∗+. Moreover, lim0+ (g − h) = +∞ and lim+∞ (g − h) = −∞. Hence the equation
g (λ) = h (λ) has a unique solution on R∗+ that we denote λmax. Since g is decreasing and h is
increasing, one also have that f (λmax) = maxR+
f . Thus,
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) ≤ γ + (1− τ) log (f (λmax))
= γ + (1− τ) log (g (λmax))
= γ + (1− τ) log (h (λmax)) (8)
Finally, with some calculus, one gets that
λmax =
1− (b+ 2γ)Lτ (b) +
√
[(b+ 2γ)Lτ (b)− 1]2 + 8γLτ (b)
4γLτ (b)
.
Analyzing the right part of the formula, we get
[(b+ 2γ)Lτ (b)− 1]2 + 8γLτ (b) = [(b+ 2γ)Lτ (b)]2 − 2 (b+ 2γ)Lτ (b) + 1 + 8γLτ (b)
= [(b+ 2γ)Lτ (b)]
2
+ 2 (2γ − b)Lτ (b) + 1
≤ [(b+ 2γ)Lτ (b)]2 + 2 (2γ + b)Lτ (b) + 1
(because b ≥ 0 and Lτ (b) ≥ 0)
= [(b+ 2γ)Lτ (b) + 1]
2
.
We then have
λmax ≤ 1
2γLτ (b)
.
Since h is increasing, from Equation (8) the following holds:
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) ≤ γ + (1− τ) log
(
h
(
1
2γLτ (b)
))
= γ + (1− τ) log
(
Lτ (b)
[
b+ 2γ
(
1 +
1
2γLτ (b)
)])
= γ + (1− τ) log (Lτ (b) b+ 2γLτ (b) + 1) . (9)
Since the clear counts of at most two classes differ between the two adjacent databases (because
at most one teacher changes his vote), we get, by composition, that the mechanism that reports the
histogram constituted of the K noisy counts is (, 0)-differentially private with
 = 2γ + 2× (1− τ) log (Lτ (b) b+ 2γLτ (b) + 1) .
Finally, as report noisy max can be seen as the result of a postprocessing of the report noisy histogram,
it has the same DP guarantee.
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Starting back from Lemma 3, we can get Theorem 3 with a little calculus. Let β ∈ ( 12 , 1). We denote
φβ : b ∈ R∗+ 7→ Lβ (b) b+ 2γLβ (b) + 1.
Lemma 4. For any β ∈ ( 12 , 1) , φβ has a minimum on R∗+ which is reached in bmin (β) =
−W−1
(
(β − 1) eβ−1−2γ) + β − 1 − 2γ, where W−1 is the lower real branch of the Lambert
function.
Proof. Let β ∈ ( 12 , 1). For all b ∈ R∗+,
φ′β (b) = L
′
β (b) b+ Lβ (b) + 2γL
′
β (b)
= L′β (b)
[
b+ (β − 1) (eb − 1)+ 2γ] .
because we have L′β (b) =
Lβ(b)
(β−1)(eb−1) < 0 for all b ∈ R∗+.
Hence we get
φ′β (b) ≤ 0⇐⇒ b+ (β − 1)
(
eb − 1)+ 2γ ≥ 0
⇐⇒ (β − 1) eb + b+ 1− β + 2γ ≥ 0.
We obtain an equation of the form a1ez + a2z + a3 = 0, whose solutions depend on the value of the
discriminant a1a2 e
− a3a2 = (β − 1) eβ−1−2γ ∈ (− 1e , 0).
Hence, denoting W0 and W−1 the two branches of the Lambert function and ζ := β − 1− 2γ, the
equation (β − 1) eb + b+ 1− β + 2γ = 0 has two distinct solutions on R, −W0
(
(β − 1) eζ)+ ζ
and −W−1
(
(β − 1) eζ)+ ζ.
To select the appropriate solutions, let us study the sign of −W0
(
(β − 1) eζ) + ζ and
−W−1
(
(β − 1) eζ)+ ζ.
First case: ζ ≤ −1
In this case W0
(
(β − 1) eζ) ≥ −1, then we have −W0 ((β − 1) eζ)+ ζ ≤ 0. Besides,
−W−1
(
(β − 1) eζ)+ ζ > 0⇐⇒W−1 ((β − 1) eζ) < ζ
⇐⇒ (β − 1) eζ > ζeζ
(since both W−1
(
(β − 1) eζ) and ζ are smaller than −1, we can apply y 7→ yey which is strictly
decreasing on (−∞,−1])
⇐⇒ β − 1 > ζ
⇐⇒ 2γ > 0.
Second case: ζ > −1
Since W−1
(
(β − 1) eζ) ≤ −1, −W−1 ((β − 1) eζ)+ ζ > 0. Besides,
−W0
(
(β − 1) eζ)+ ζ ≤ 0⇐⇒W0 ((β − 1) eζ) ≥ ζ
⇐⇒ (β − 1) eζ ≥ ζeζ
(since both W0
(
(β − 1) eζ) and ζ are greater than −1, we can apply y 7→ yey which is increasing
on [−1,+∞))
⇐⇒ 2γ ≥ 0.
Since γ > 0, in both cases we have −W0
(
(β − 1) eζ) + ζ ≤ 0 < −W−1 ((β − 1) eζ) + ζ.
Hence, φβ has a minimum on R∗+ which is reached in bmin (β) := −W−1
(
(β − 1) eζ) + ζ =
−W−1
(
(β − 1) eβ−1−2γ)+ β − 1− 2γ.
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Theorem 3. Let τ ∈ ( 12 , 1) be the fraction of the teachers that did send their noisy votes properly
to the aggregation server. The remaining teachers are assumed to have sent their votes without any
noise (but still encrypted). We denote A the aggregation mechanism. Then, A is (, 0)-differentially
private, with
 = 2γ + 2 (1− τ) log
(
w(τ)
[
Γ (2τ − 1)
Γ (τ)
×
(
1 +
1− τ
w(τ)
)] 1
1−τ
+ 1
)
where Γ: x ∈ R∗+ 7→
∫ +∞
0
tx−1e−xdt and w(τ) = −W−1
(
(τ − 1) eτ−1−2γ)+ τ − 1, W−1 being
the lower real branch of the Lambert function.
Proof. By construction, e−bmin(τ) = 1−τbmin(τ)+1−τ+2γ .
Then 1− e−bmin(τ) = bmin(τ)+2γbmin(τ)+2γ+1−τ and Lτ (bmin (τ)) =
[
Γ(2τ−1)
Γ(τ) ×
(
1 + 1−τbmin(τ)+2γ
)] 1
1−τ
.
Let o ∈ R+ and k ∈ [K] such that nk 6= n′k. Starting back from Lemma 3, we have
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′) ≤ γ + (1− τ) log (φτ (bmin (τ))). Then, applying Lemma 4, we get
c(o; Ak, aux, d, d′)
≤ γ + (1− τ) log (φτ (bmin (τ)))
= γ + (1− τ) log ((bmin (τ) + 2γ)Lτ (bmin (τ)) + 1)
= γ + (1− τ) log
(
(bmin (τ) + 2γ)
[
Γ (2τ − 1)
Γ (τ)
×
(
1 +
1− τ
bmin (τ) + 2γ
)] 1
1−τ
+ 1
)
= γ + (1− τ) log
([−W−1 ((τ − 1) eτ−1−2γ)+ τ − 1]
×
[
Γ (2τ − 1)
Γ (τ)
×
(
1 +
1− τ
−W−1 ((τ − 1) eτ−1−2γ) + τ − 1
)] 1
1−τ
+ 1
)
.
A.3 Influence of the HE layer on the DP guarantee per query
The computation of the homomorphic argmax induces some perturbations on the noisy counts and,
as such, could harm the DP guarantees that we just gave. Nevertheless, we here show that the
perturbations due to the HE layer have the same effect as some postprocessing applied on the clear
noisy histogram, hence letting the DP guarantees unchanged11.
The three kinds of perturbations due to the HE layer are:
• the addition of (Gaussian) noise at the time of TFHE encryption which is inherently proba-
bilistic
• the addition of a constant value A on the noisy counts to ensure that all the noisy counts are
positive (with high probability) (see Section C)
• a possible mistake on the argmax if two noisy counts are too close (see Section 5 of the
main paper)
The additions of Gaussian noise and constant A at encryption have, by commutativity, the same effect
as the addition of a sum of Gaussian noises and nA after sommation (and addition of the Laplace
noise in the HBC case).
As far as the mistake on the argmax is concerned, it can be simulated via a probabilistic algorithm
which would randomly modify some counts of the clear noisy histogram.
11Indeed, the guarantees from Section A.2 apply to the noisy histogram as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.
As for the HBC case, we refer the reader to the well-known result for report noisy histogram with disjoint data
subsets, e.g. in [15].
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A.4 Upper bound of the probability of a report noisy max mistake
In this subsection, we give an upper bound of the probability that the report noisy max mechanism
gives a wrong argmax in the BHBC framework.
Proposition 2. Let us consider a query Q ∈ Q. Let τ ∈ ( 12 , 1] be the ratio of successful teachers.
Let k∗ ∈ [K] be the unnoisy argmax (for all k ∈ [K], nk∗ ≥ nk). Then,
P[A(d;Q) 6= k∗] ≤ 22−4τ Γ(2τ − 1)
2
Γ(τ)4
∑
k 6=k∗
2 + γ(nk∗ − nk)
eγ(nk∗−nk)
Proof. For k ∈ [K], let us denote Yk the random variable following the generalized Laplace distri-
bution generated by the sum of the τn individual noises. Using the expression of the density of the
generalized Laplace distribution recalled in the proof of Lemma 3, and defining ∆k = nk∗ − nk,
with some raw calculus, we get:
P(nk + Yk ≥ nk∗ + Yk∗)
= P(Yk ≥ Yk∗ + ∆k)
=
γ4τ
Γ(τ)4
∫ +∞
−∞
e−γ|t|Iτ (|t|)
∫ +∞
t+∆k
e−γ|u|Iτ (|u|)du dt
≤ γ
4τ
Γ(τ)4
× Iτ (0)2
∫ +∞
−∞
e−γ|t|
∫ +∞
t+∆k
e−γ|u|du dt
(because Iτ is decreasing on R+)
=
Γ(2τ − 1)2
Γ(τ)4
× γ
2
24τ−2
×
∫ +∞
−∞
e−γ|t|
∫ +∞
t+∆k
e−γ|u|du dt
(applying Lemma 2)
=
Γ(2τ − 1)2
Γ(τ)4
× γ
2
24τ−2
×
[∫ +∞
0
e−γt
∫ +∞
t+∆k
e−γudu dt
+
∫ −∆k
−∞
eγt
(∫ 0
t+∆k
eγudu+
∫ +∞
0
e−γudu
)
dt+
∫ 0
−∆k
eγt
∫ +∞
t+∆k
e−γudu dt
]
.
We have ∫ +∞
0
e−γt
∫ +∞
t+∆k
e−γudu dt =
∫ +∞
0
e−γt
e−γ(t+∆k)
γ
dt
=
1
γ
∫ +∞
0
e−γ(2t+∆k)dt
=
e−γ∆k
2γ2
and ∫ −∆k
−∞
eγt
(∫ 0
t+∆k
eγudu+
∫ +∞
0
e−γudu
)
dt =
∫ −∆k
−∞
eγt
(
1− eγ(t+∆k)
γ
+
1
γ
)
dt
=
1
γ
∫ −∆k
−∞
(
2eγt − eγ(2t+∆k)
)
dt
=
2e−γ∆k
γ2
− e
−γ∆k
2γ2
=
3e−γ∆k
2γ2
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Besides, ∫ 0
−∆k
eγt
∫ +∞
t+∆k
e−γudu dt =
∫ 0
−∆k
eγt
e−γ(t+∆k)
γ
dt
=
1
γ
∫ 0
−∆k
e−γ∆kdt
=
∆ke
−γ∆k
γ
dt
Finally,
P(nk + Yk ≥ nk∗ + Yk∗) = Γ(2τ − 1)
2
Γ(τ)4
× γ
2
24τ−2
×
[
2e−γ∆k
γ2
+
∆ke
−γ∆k
γ
]
=
Γ(2τ − 1)2
Γ(τ)4
× 22−4τ × 2 + γ∆k
eγ∆k
The overall upper bound for P[A(d;Q) 6= k∗] is obtained using the fact that the event (A(d;Q) 6= k∗)
is the union of the events (nk + Yk ≥ nk∗ + Yk∗), for k ∈ [K] \ {k∗}, and then P[A(d;Q) 6= k∗] ≤∑
k 6=k∗ P(nk + Yk ≥ nk∗ + Yk∗).
Note that, when τ approaches 1, we recover P[A(d;Q) 6= k∗] ≤∑k 6=k∗ 2+γ(nk∗−nk)4eγ(nk∗−nk) which is the
bound used by Papernot et al. in [34] and our bound for HBC framework.
Remark. The data-dependent bound αA(l; aux, d, d′) ≤ log
(
(1− q)
(
1−q
1−eq
)l
+ qel
)
from
Theorem 1 is non-monotonic in γ. This may appear counter-intuitive since a smaller noise (greater
γ) usually gives less privacy guarantees and, as one would expect, a bigger moments accountant.
Nevertheless, a smaller noise means that the probability of outputting the true (unnoisy) argmax is
closer to 1, leading naturally to a smaller moments accountant. Indeed, two adjacent databases will
both output the true argmax with high probability, giving less chance to an adversary to distinguish
them. This non-monotonicity of the data-dependent bound induces the non-monotonicity of the
overall privacy cost . We took this phenomenon into account in our analysis. Accordingly, we chose
a fairly small noise (high value of γ) to perform our experiments.
B More detailed problem setting
B.1 Use-case example and possible attacks
An example of scenario from the field of cybersecurity is when several actors each hold a database of
cybersecurity incident signatures, that have occurred on their customer networks. Building a model
from a larger set of such signatures would lead to improved detection capabilities. However, these
databases are highly-sensitive and highly-valuable. As such, they cannot be disclosed (notwithstand-
ing legal barriers to do so). In such a setting, the data owners wish to collaboratively train a global
model while preserving the confidentiality of their learning sets. In order to build a global model, our
actors may decide to rely on a third-party server embedded in a system architecture which has to be
resistant to the threats with respect to both the aggregation server and the global model recipient
(note that in our example, and in many real-world settings, all the training data providers may be
recipients of the global model). Hence, it is clearly an issue if, given a particular data instance,
and some (black-box [41], or white-box [47]) access to the global model, a membership inference
attack [40] can indicate with high accuracy the probability that the instance has been used to train the
model as it would potentially reveal that a given cyberattack scenario actually occurred within the
networks supervised by one of the actors. Also, given a set of instances, the risk of a model inversion
attack [45] which tries to infer sensitive attributes on the instances from a supposedly non-sensitive
(often white-box) access to the model, is to be seriously taken into account as it would allow to infer
e.g. that some of the networks supervised by an actor are more prone to certain kinds of cyberattacks.
Lastly, it is also an issue if even features of the actors’ models can be inferred by others as Tramer
et al. [42], followed by more recent works [46, 44], demonstrated that even with limited access to
a model, an adversary can infer important features of that model such as the hyperparameters or
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its architecture. In this latter case, this would clearly leak some information on e.g. the detection
capabilities of an actor giving a potential advantage to cyberattackers of the networks it supervises.
B.2 FHE deployment scenario and threat model
With respect to securing aggregation, we work in the following tripartite setting. The student model
is the owner of the homomorphic encryption scheme under which encrypted-domain computations
will be performed by the aggregation server, that is it generates and knows both pk and sk. Then,
when being submitted an unlabeled input, the teachers encrypt their predictions under pk and send
these encryptions to the server. The server then has the responsibility to homomorphically perform
the aggregation in order to produce an encryption of the output (e.g. a label) which will be sent back
to the student and used by the latter for learning, after due decryption. Homomorphic encryption thus
provides a countermeasure to confidentiality threats on the teachers’ predictions from the aggregation
server. In this setting, we do not address threats whereby the student model and the aggregation server
collude (in which case the student model may e.g. share sk with the server so that they both get access
to the teachers’ predictions) or threats where the aggregation server behaves maliciously, e.g. to
prevent the student model from effectively learning from the teachers, leading to more or less stealthy
forms of denial-of-service. This is typical of scenarios in which homomorphic encryption intervenes
and our setting thus covers the so-called HBC / BHBC threat models whereby the aggregation server
is assumed to operate properly.
C FHE argmax implementation details
We implemented the FHE argmax algorithm using the C++ TFHE library [12]. Table 3 presents all of
the parameters needed to reproduce our results and build a fully homomorphic argmax scheme using
the TFHE library. The first two lines present our values for the standard TFHE parameters: the first
line for initial ciphertext encryption; the second line for the two bootstrapping keys we use. Given
the parameters that we use here, we achieve a security parameter of 110. We base the security of our
scheme on the lwe-estimator12 script. The estimator is based on the work presented in [3] and is
consistently kept up to date.
Table 3: Parameter for our implementation. The top line presents the overall security (λ), and
the parameters for the initial encryption: σ is the Gaussian noise parameter and N is the size of
polynomials. In the TFHE encryption scheme, there is a parameter k (different from the one used in
this paper) which, in our case, is always equal to 1. The second line presents the parameters needed to
create the two bootstrapping keys we are using. For these two lines, we used the notations from [48]
and [11]. The third line presents parameters specific to our implementation given the specificities of
the data to process. A is the value to add to the ciphertexts before subtracting nk + Yk − nk′ − Yk′
as per the notations in Section 4.1 of the paper. bi is the modulus with which the values are rescaled
at encryption time to obtain values in [0, 1] and to allow for a correct result of the θ computation. b(1)θ
is the output modulus of the first bootstrapping operation creating the θ values. b(2)θ is the output
modulus of the second and final bootstrapping operation.
N σ
1024 1e−9
Nb σb Bg `
1024 1e-9 64 6
A bi b
(1)
θ b
(2)
θ
900 4102 36 4
The third line presents parameters that are specific to our implementation. Because of the use of a
Laplace distribution (in the HBC framework) or a Gamma distribution (in the BHBC framework), the
values sent by the teachers can be negative. This can be an important issue: if a value is negative, then
it will be interpreted in the ciphertext space as a very high positive value and the resulting argmax
will be wrong. Therefore, after summing the ciphertexts from the teachers, we add a constant value
(we can add a clear value to a ciphertext value) A to ensure that the nk + Yk + A are all positive
12 https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator/raw/HEAD/estimator.py
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before subtraction. We evaluated that, given the Laplace distribution or Gamma distribution used,
choosing A = 900 gives us less than a 2−64 probability of failure: with Yk following a Laplace
distribution (as seen in Section 4 of the main paper), then we have P(Yk < −A) < 2−64. The bi
variable corresponds to the value by which we rescale the cleartexts before encryption. Indeed, the
cleartext and ciphertext spaces of the TFHE encryption scheme are both T = ([0, 1],+). Additionally,
for a correct θ computation, we need to have |nk+Yk−nk′−Yk′bi | < 12 , which is true if, for all k ∈ [K],
nk+Yk+A
bi
∈ [0, 12 ). Since P(Yk >= A) < 2−64 by symmetry, bi = 2(n + 2A) = 4100 (with n
the number of teachers) is sufficient to have |nk+Yk−nk′−Yk′bi | < 12 with high probability. b
(1)
θ is the
output modulus of the first bootstrapping operation. It needs to be chosen so that we have Θk > 12
for one and only one k. That k will then be considered the argmax. b(2)θ is the modulus for the final
bootstrapping operation.
D Detailed experimental settings and extended results
In this section, we provide the reader with additional details regarding experimental settings, as well
as complementary results obtained on the SVHN dataset.
D.1 Experimental settings for MNIST
Following PATE experimental conditions, we built our framework based, with some modifications, on
the code repositories13 accompanying [34]. The teacher models are based on two convolutional layers
with max-pooling and one fully connected layer with ReLUs. The execution environment consists in
python 3 and tensorflow 1.15.0. The batch size, learning rate and max steps parameters have been
respectively set to 128, 0.01 and 5000. As stated in [34], this yields an aggregate test-error rate of
93%. A semi-supervised technique proposed in [38] has been used14, in an execution environment
consisting of python 3 and Theano 0.7. Besides modifications provided as complementary files, the
learning rate and number of epochs have been set to 0.001 and 500, respectively.
D.2 Experimental settings for SVHN
For SVHN, two additional layers have been added to the teacher models which were learned using
a node with 8 NVIDIA v100. The batch size, learning rate and max steps parameters have been
respectively set to 64, 0.08 and 2000. The student model also uses the improved GAN semi-supervised
model, relying on python 3 and theano 0.8.2. Besides modifications provided as complementary files,
the learning rate and number of epochs have been set to 0.0003 and 600, respectively.
D.3 Additional results for SVHN
Table 4 presents our experimental results on SVHN dataset.The variance on the accuracy is much
smaller than for MNIST dataset because the test set is constituted of 16032 samples. As expected, the
accuracy increases when less noise is applied because less teachers noised their votes in the BHBC
framework (i.e. when τ is small). The DP guarantees are not as good as for MNIST, this is due to the
high amount of queries (500) necessary to obtain a good accuracy because the learning task is more
complex. Note also that the noise we used is quite small (γ = 1.1), which is better for DP guarantees
in the BHBC framework (see remark in Section A.4) with τ < 1 but harms the DP guarantee for the
HBC framework.
E Report noisy histogram
E.1 Homomorphic histogram computation with Partial HE schemes
On top of the types of FHE presented in Section 3.2 of the main paper, there also exist partial
encryption schemes which, despite placing severe restrictions on the kind of computations which can
be performed in the encrypted domain, are of practical interest.
13https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy/tree/master/research/pate_2017
14https://github.com/openai/improved-gan
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Table 4: SVHN experimental results with noise inverse scale γ = 1.1, δ = 10−5, 500 queries
Framework  Acc. [%] HE overhead
Non-private - 84.7 -
Trusted 10.12 83.7 -
HBC 10.12 83.5
32.5 minBHBC, τ = 1 10.12 83.5BHBC, τ = 0.9 15.71 83.8
BHBC, τ = 0.7 31.38 84.6
Partial HE (PHE). In partial homomorphic encryption schemes, only one of the two ⊕ and ⊗
operators is supported. The most important such scheme is that of Paillier [33], which provides the ⊕
operator along with a cleartext vs ciphertext multiplication operator i.e.,
k ⊗ Enc(m) = Enc(km) ∈ Ω, with k ∈ Λ.
When the aggregation function consists in just returning a noisy histogram of the votes i.e. (following
the notations in Section 4.1 of the paper) the K
nk + Yk
where Yk denotes a random variable drawn from the Laplace distribution of inverse scale parameter
γ ∈ R∗+, then it can be computed with an additive-only homomorphic encryption scheme which is
very interesting as we can either:
1. Use a plain-old additively-homomorphic cryptosystem such as Paillier or (additive-flavored)
ElGamal (requiring O(nK) homomorphic additions, where n is the number of teachers).
2. Use a depth-0 optimized SHE scheme such as BFV or BGV which, with appropriate use of
batching, will allow to compute the histogram and noise it in O(n) rather than O(nK) (parallel)
homomorphic additions i.e. the i-th teacher generates a single ciphertexts of the form
Enc(z(i)1 , ..., z
(i)
K , 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ
),
(assuming K << κ) and these ciphertexts are summed following Equation 5 of the main paper.
Choosing between the two options does not only depend on the performances of the resulting ag-
gregation operator. Indeed, from a security perspective, the aforementioned partial homomorphic
encryption schemes are very well understood and can be used in real-world highly sensitive applica-
tions15. However, these cryptosystems are not postquantum, meaning that a hypothetical large-scale
quantum computer may break them in some undetermined distant future. More advanced SHE or
FHE cryptosystems all have their security based on euclidean lattice problems which, despite being
postquantum, are (at present) less well understood from a practical security point of view with new
(yet exponential-time) attacks regularly being published and requiring to revisit these cryptosystems’
parameters towards larger parameters and less efficiency. This state of affairs implies that, at present,
SHE and FHE performances have not yet stabilized and that previously encrypted data (with a given
public set of parameters) may become vulnerable. For these reasons, when dealing with high-value
training data, it appears more appropriate to stick to plain-old additive HE if the application allows it
(as it is the case in this section).
E.2 Experimental results
We implemented Paillier cryptosystem in order to determine the computational overhead due to the
homomorphic layer in the report noisy histogram model.
15For example, some governmental entities such as the ANSSI RGS (which is the French Government official
framework for cryptographic parameter settings) explain how to parametrize the Paillier cryptosystem to achieve
a given security target.
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Reducing online overhead. Note that the encryption function of the Paillier cryptosystem is one of
the costliest operations (with the decryption). Fortunately, it can be split in a cleartext-dependent
part and a cleartext-independent part which, as such, can be done offline and captures most of the
encryption cost. In a nutshell [8], given m ∈ Zν , we have Enc(m) = gmrν mod ν2, where g and
ν are part of the public key and where r is uniformly drawn in Zν . Since usually m << ν, the
costly term is h = rν mod ν2 (modular exponentiation with large exponents costs a lot) which
does not depend on m and, given h, Enc(m) = gmh mod ν2. This trick greatly improves the
practicability of our framework since these precomputations ensure that, despite its computational
cost, the encryption step induces no latency. The remaining encryption operations made online are
far less demanding.
Avoiding negative values. The addition of noise in both HBC and BHBC frameworks may lead to an
encryption of negative values which would be treated by the modulo ν operation as very high integers,
requiring costly high-power exponentiations16. In order to avoid these costly exponentiations we add
a constant value A to all the noises so that the noisy counts are all positive with high probability17. It
is the same trick as for TFHE cryptosystem (Section C) but it is not used for the same reason. For
Paillier cryptosystem, we do not need this trick to ensure that the output argmax is correct since we
can filter the very high integers in the decrypted histogram and consider them as the trace of negative
noises, and hence subtract ν to the decrypted value. On the contrary, in TFHE case, as the argmax
is performed in the secret domain, we cannot perform such a postprocessing. However, the trick is
actually useful in Paillier scheme to reduce the encryption time as we discussed above18.
Table 5: Detailed computational overhead of HE per query (milliseconds) - We used a 2048 bits
modulus ν (which is standard dimensioning to achieve strong medium-term security), 250 teachers,
10 classes and an inverse scale parameter of the noise γ = 3.3. The table displays, for HBC and
BHBC with τ = 1, the time of offline precomputation, encryption, homomorphic aggregation,
decryption and the total online overhead which is the sum of all the operations’ times except the
offline precomputation. Note that smaller values of τ would give slightly smaller overheads since
less noise would be added.
Framework Offline prec. Encryption Aggregation Decryption Total online ov.
HBC 218 0.3 31 (27+4) 216 247
BHBC 218 4 29 222 255
Table 5 details the computational overhead per query on an Intel Core i3-3120M CPU. The detailed
overhead is the same with HBC or BHBC frameworks except for two operations - the online
encryption and the homomorphic aggregation. These two slight differences actually come from the
same operation, namely the encryption of the noise augmented by the constant A, which takes place
at the aggregation step for HBC framework and at the encryption step for BHBC framework. Note
that the computational overhead does not depend on the dataset we use except for the number of
teachers and classes.
As shown in Table 5, the overall HE computational overhead is about 250 ms per query, which is more
than an order of magnitude under the HE overhead in the report noisy max scheme (cf. Section 5 of
the main paper). As announced, if the HE layer relies on an additive-only homomorphic cryptosystem,
the cost of cryptographic security is much smaller.
E.3 Impracticability of the histogram scheme in terms of DP
Let us consider the DP analysis detailed in Section A.1 and summarized in Algorithm 1 for the
report noisy max scheme. The privacy guarantee mostly relies on the possibility of evaluating a
tight data-dependent bound of the moments accountant per query. This bound is based on a privacy
guarantee per query (using e.g. Theorem 3) and an upperbound of the probability P[A(d;Q) 6= o∗]
that A does not output some specific output o∗.
16Because we would not have m << ν anymore but, rather, m is almost ν.
17We chose A = 900, ensuring that P(Yk < −A) < 2−64
18Note that in TFHE scheme, by contrast, the encryption time does not depend on the cleartext value.
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Per query, reporting the noisy histogram has the same privacy guarantee as the report noisy max
scheme because the personal databases di are disjoint. This is true both for HBC (see for example [15])
and BHBC framework (see Theorem 3 19).
The crucial difference between releasing the noisy histogram or the noisy argmax comes from the
impossibility of determining a reasonable upper bound for the probability of the server outputting a
wrong histogram. This prevents us from using the data-dependent part of the bound from Theorem 1 20.
Hence we have to restrict our analysis to a more classical data-independent bound e.g. 
2l(l+1)
2 .
In practice, this would lead, for δ = 10−5, to an astronomical value of  (more than 6000) for
both HBC and BHBC frameworks if the noise inverse scale parameter is γ = 3.3. Even with a
far more significant noise of γ = 0.05, we would still have very bad DP guarantees of 21, 273,
1608 respectively for HBC, BHBC with τ = 0.9 and τ = 0.7. This explains the impracticability of
releasing the noisy histogram in terms of privacy guarantees. However, given the great improvement
linear operators offer in terms of HE, we are currently studying a different way to circumvent the
limitations we have on the DP analysis.
19The proof of Theorem 3 actually demonstrates the privacy guarrantees for the histogram query and consider
the evaluation of the argmax as a post-processing.
20log
(
(1− q)
(
1−q
1−eq
)l
+ qel
)
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